The Bhoja tragedy

About 40 major air crashes worldwide occurred during the landing/take-off phases between 1950 and 2000 where turbulence or crosswind were identified as the principal factors, and of them 39 were wind shear or downdraft related. The wounds of the Airblue crash were still fresh and had barely healed when a catastrophe of a similar magnitude struck again at the same airport under somewhat similar circumstances just 22 months later. Both air tragedies involved private airlines operating aircraft that had been certified as airworthy by the country’s relevant authority but the public perception about their safety standards was less than satisfactory. Nevertheless, they attract their fair share of air travellers as generally they provide a more cost-efficient service than the established but much maligned national carrier, PIA.

The public outrage against the awful safety record of commercial flights, even when occasionally it went overboard, may be justified but the crude playing of politics on this scale of human tragedy by most of the political parties in the opposition is not. Many of us, the so-called experts in the field of aviation safety, further muddied the waters by our emotional outbursts and conclusions relying on rudimentary evidence. An objective analysis based on the evidence available to date has become necessary to end the witch-hunting that has started even before the investigation team has completed their collection of all evidence and relevant information from the crash site.

The focus of the media and majority of the experts is on the old vintage platform (the ill-fated B737-200 that crashed was about 27 years old) that Bhoja Air was operating and is considered by many as unsafe for operations as a commercial airliner. They further cast serious aspersions on the manner in which the air operating licence and airworthiness certificates of its aging fleet were issued to the company. These serious allegations carry weight in lieu of the unsavoury reputation the company had earned in its first stint as a private airline that eventually led to its closure over a decade ago. In any air accident investigation of such a magnitude, a thorough examination of these parameters is an essential part, regardless of the good or bad reputation of the airline involved. Pronouncing the guilty verdict even before the investigation has started in earnest, however, is unfair.

If malpractices are discovered in the issuance of licences and airworthiness certificates during the investigation, appropriate actions against the defaulters must be taken. Their relevance as the ‘causal factors’, however, would apply only if aircraft malfunction and/or pilot errors are established as the primary or even secondary causes of the crash. If on the other hand, the team concludes that events beyond the control of the aircrew or the operator led to the tragic event, these acts, however reprehensible, along with the old age of the aircraft will no more be relevant in this particular disaster although addressing them without delay would be crucial to prevent another one. In the findings of the investigation into the Airblue crash, tape recordings of the conversation between the tower and the aircraft and the communications between the pilot and the co-pilot extracted from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) conclusively established fatal misjudgement by the pilot in command as the primary factor. In the Bhoja tragedy, based on the data available to date, the investigators perhaps would be confronted with a far more complex problem.

Consider the following the aircraft was cautioned and warned about turbulence, strong gusting winds and the presence of thundery activity around the airfield but departure and arrival had not been suspended and there are reports of successful landings by a couple of commercial flights during that period. The decision of the captain to continue the approach indicates that the weather details were within the acceptable parameters as provided by the manufacturer and the operator. The approach radar details released so far indicate that the aircraft was well established in the ILS approach mode with the autopilot engaged in landing configuration. It was cleared to change to tower frequency at about seven kilometres short of the touchdown point, which it did and was given the final landing clearance. According to eyewitnesses, the aircraft, which was in the clear below the clouds, suddenly lost height, impacted the ground in almost level attitude, bounced up and started to disintegrate in the air. No distress call was monitored by the tower. Further confirmation of these details will be easily established by the examination of the Black Box. Assuming that the Black Box (Flight Data Recorder and CVR) does not reveal any malfunction in the aircraft system, including the autopilot, until the sudden flight path departure, severe weather phenomena like wind shear or microburst would then become the principal suspect that the investigators would concentrate on.

This is not the first instance where an apparently fully serviceable aircraft flown by qualified aircrew suddenly lost height during landing and crashed well short of the runway, killing all occupants. About 40 major air crashes worldwide occurred during the landing/take-off phases between 1950 and 2000 where turbulence or crosswind were identified as the principal factors, and of them 39 were wind shear or downdraft related. In 1985, the FAA published an advisory circular on pilot wind shear guide to enhance pilots’ skills in identifying, avoiding and handling wind shear conditions. In 1987, FAA further proposed training guidelines and related statistics. The paper pointed out avoidance is the best defence against the hazards of wind shear and a severe wind shear condition is beyond the handling ability of commercial aircraft and even highly skilful pilots. In 1987, ICAO proposed a method to measure the wind shear hazard. This method categorises wind shear into four levels light, moderate, strong and severe. Airfields cognizant of the method are expected to pass on this information along with other weather details to all approaching and departing flights. It would be worthwhile for the investigation team to examine if these recommendations have been adopted by the airline and airport operators in Pakistan.

The public and the media, based on their earlier experience, do not trust any report/commission established by the government. In addition, suspicion about the likelihood of Safety Investigation Board (SIB) fudging those aspects of the report that cast their parent organisation in poor light has been raised in various quarters. This is a valid observation and in most countries, the Air Accident Investigation Cell is an independent entity and normally is answerable to the chief executive of the country. It must, however, be pointed out that even in the current setup, while the investigation team is headed by the SIB, full representation of all involved parties (airline, aircraft manufacturer, local and international pilots associations) is mandatory. The final report eventually is sent to ICAO whose task is to ensure recommendations are circulated to all relevant functionaries. The possibility of fabrications is practically non-existent.

Airline operators are well advised to remember the famous safety slogan, ‘If you consider safety measures expensive, try an accident.’ The general travelling public too must remember that absolute safety in air travel is a mirage and if one insists on zero risk during flight, one would be well advised to adopt some other means of travel. Incidentally, statistics indicate worldwide that air travel is infinitely safer than road or even rail journeys. In the end, a compromise with a heavy bias on security is the only practical answer. Pakistan’s civil aviation standards on paper are as stringent as any other nation but the problem is one of implementation both at the operator and regulatory levels. That is an area where major improvements are required if the country is to break free of its current abysmal flight safety record in commercial aviation.